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And it is not just in her epistemology that Astell seems Cartesian; she also endorses Descartes' dualism of mind and body. Like Descartes, Astell links this dualistic ontology with a conception of method in which a thinker seeks certain knowledge by eschewing the information provided by the senses (what Descartes calls "adventitious ideas"), focusing instead on the deliverances of reason alone. Descartes calls this absolutely certain knowledge "scientia," while Astell calls it "science." 3 Descartes' concern with the pursuit of scientia is announced at the beginning of his Meditations, where he observes that he is seeking something "stable and likely to last" in the sciences [scientiis], rather than the shifting, potentially doubtful knowledge that he had until then possessed. 4 For Astell, too, the highest standard for reasoned knowledge is "science," which she contrasts in A Serious Proposal Part II with "opinion," "faith," and mere "moral certainty" (149). As with Cartesian scientia, this "science" is to be attained through clear and distinct perception .
5 Yet Astell's account of science diverges from Cartesian scientia in interesting ways; she is more sensitive to the role that the body and its passions play in the acquisition of knowledge, and she sees a place for scientia in ordinary life, not just in the "rarefied exercise" of the pure intellect. 6 Furthermore, Astell links Cartesian dualism in a novel way with the concept of "separate spheres." In Christian Religion, she clearly endorses the claim that men are more suited for active lives, while women "ought to be Retir'd," living in the private sphere (296). Yet Astell holds that life in the public sphere leads to a sort of machinelike life, in which the body operates without the involvement of the intellect. In linking retirement at home with the life of the mind, Astell suggests that the intellectual pursuit of truth reunites mind with body.
Descartes on Scientia and Astell on Science
In her Serious Proposal Part II, Astell identifies various types of understanding. Despite the echoes of Descartes throughout Astell's epistemology, her language here actually recalls Locke's distinctions in Book IV of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke identifies three main types of knowing, which he calls intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive; he also refers to faith and opinion, which he notes fall short of knowledge. 7 All of these have parallels in Astell's discussion. For Locke, intuitive knowledge is immediate, requiring no process of reasoning, and is maximally certain (531). Knowledge acquired by reasoning differs from intuition, Locke says, insofar as it involves deducing claims from other claims. Reasoning comes in two varieties. If the relations between the ideas involved in the reasoning are "plainly and clearly perceived," then the reasoning is demonstrative or "scientifical" (532, 534). However, if these relations are uncertain and merely probable, then, Locke argues, we have merely "Faith, or Opinion" (537).
8 Interestingly, Locke stresses that demonstrative or "scientifical" knowledge need not only be about mathematics; moral truths regarding "the Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action" are potential candidates for demonstration (534, 549) .
In Serious Proposal Part II, Astell structures her discussion of knowledge around the same categories as Locke. First, there is knowledge of selfevident first principles, acquired by "intuition" (149). There are, Astell writes, only a few such principles; everything else has to be inferred through some process of "Reasoning and Deduction" (149). Here she identifies three "modes" or types of reasoning, which she calls "science," "opinion," and "faith."
9 In her initial discussion of these three forms of reasoning, Astell claims that all three involve deduction from premises, but differ either in the confidence with which one can draw the conclusion, or in the "degrees of Clearness and Evidence in the Premises from whence the Conclusion is drawn" (149). Thus when a conclusion is correctly drawn from absolutely clear, evident premises-a case in which the thinker can have complete confidence in the conclusionthe knowledge thereby attained is called "science."
10 If the premises are less certain, or the conclusion does not seem to follow necessarily, then, Astell notes, one's thinking is a form of "opinion." If the premises are drawn from some authority (rather than being clear and evident to the thinker herself ), then one possesses "faith." The authority may be a
